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Abstract 
Reliable and scalable communication technologies are required to securely integrate and utilise the flexibility offered by 
different smart grid solutions. Smart secondary substations can play a critical role in enabling the flexibility services for the 
DSO with more monitoring and control functions being deployed at these substations. However, there are a number of challenges 
associated with the deployment and integration of communications to enable future DSO functions. This paper defines the key 
requirements for future secondary substation communications and provides a number of recommendations to address future 
operator needs. A case study related to the deployment of a Smart Transformer for better utilisation of network assets and 
voltage regulation is presented to illustrate the applicability of aforementioned requirements. 
1 Introduction 
Smart secondary substations can significantly enhance the 
controllability and flexibility that may be required for day to 
day network operation. This may be required to facilitate the 
growing connection of low carbon network technologies 
(LCT) and distributed energy resources (DER). Secure and 
scalable communication between these secondary substations 
and the Distribution System Operator (DSO) enterprise and 
operational communication networks is key to enabling the 
delivery of reliable flexibility functions. However, there are 
number of challenges that need to be addressed such as the 
reliability, security, availability and cost effectiveness of 
communication between the DSO control centre and 
secondary substation field devices. 
 
Various communication technologies (wireless and wired) 
such as Power Line Communication (PLC), fibre optic 
communication, ADSL, Narrowband Internet of Things (NB-
IoT), mesh networks, microwave networks and mobile 
technologies (GSM, 3G, 4G/LTE) have been trialled and 
deployed by DSOs to enable different flexibility functions [1]. 
UHF telemetry is widely deployed by DSOs worldwide as a 
means for SCADA communication to control and monitor 
reclosers and switches. Recently, some DSOs have deployed 
BGAN satellite technology to remotely control and monitor 
these distributed assets [2]. All aforementioned technologies 
have some limitations. Some are not cost effective, whereas 
others are not scalable and such cannot support the 
connectivity of an increasing number of controllable assets to 
realise new critical applications (e.g. smart electric vehicle 
charging, energy storage and microgeneration control, and 
demand response). Security of a communication system 
fulfilling the confidentiality, integrity and availability 
requirements are becoming more important. The security 
overhead needed to support the authentication and encryption 
for the connected devices must be considered in the 
communication network design. This is an important 
requirement as Internet Protocol (IP) based communication 
will underpin the future DSO connectivity in most adopted 
communication technologies. 
 
Currently, most DSOs globally use a mix of communication 
technologies to connect the field devices to the control centre 
depending on application, availability and performance 
requirements. Utilising wireless technologies is reliant on 
spectrum and its availability, which in turn dictate the 
bandwidth and latency that that is available for use by DS 
applications. With sufficient spectrum using a suitable band, 
communication coverage in rural areas and the communication 
capacity required for urban areas can be satisfied. DSOs 
require a low band spectrum below 1 GHz to enhance the 
coverage in rural areas and achieve better signal reach for their 
remote sites. However, the available bandwidth below 1 GHz 
is very limited and only few narrow frequency band solutions 
are available. Meeting the coverage and capacity requirements 
are crucial for future wireless technologies that meet the needs 
for future DSO flexibility functions. This paper presents the 
main outcomes of a number of projects that developed 
bandwidth, latency, security and architecture requirements for 
communication with UK secondary substations (11kV/0.4kV) 
for various monitoring and control applications deployed to 
enhance the distribution network operation flexibility. This 
paper, firstly focuses on the development of the DSO use case 
driven communication data flows, which provides the baseline 
for determining required bandwidth and latencies for data 
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exchange. Secondly, the mapping between these data flows 
and feasible communication technologies is presented for 
different control functionalities at secondary substations. 
Thirdly, suitable strategies for secure communications in 
accordance with IEC 62351 and the UK Energy Network 
Association’s “energy delivery systems – cyber security 
procurement guidance” are outlined, while considering 
available bandwidth constraints. Finally, a number of 
recommendations will be drawn in relation to required RF 
spectrum, feasible communication technologies, 
interoperability with legacy systems and end-to-end 
communication testing requirements. 
 
2 Communication challenges and 
requirements for DSO functions 
DSO functions require real-time, reliable and secure two-way 
communications networks that maintain required performance 
and reliability as dictated by the DSO functions and the 
criticality of the connected substations and flexibility assets 
[3]. To determine which communication technologies are 
appropriate for enabling DSO functions, the basic 
requirements of communication infrastructures in terms of 
bandwidth, latency and security should be met. Additionally, 
the reliability of a chosen communication technology for 
secondary substations providing DSO services should 
minimise the rate of outages and ensure high performance data 
exchange for existing and future operational requirements [4]. 
Additional performance metrics that need to be considered in 
the network design and technology selection are availability, 
accessibility, Quality of Service, maintainability and resilience 
[5]. Furthermore, a communication technology that is fit for 
purpose is also highly dependent on affordability, which 
should be considered for large-scale field deployments and 
how cost-effective their integration with existing systems (e.g. 
enterprise network) is along with the lifetime cost of operating 
the communications solution. 
 
Moreover, power backup should be considered based on the 
availability requirements of a communication technology. The 
Energy Networks Association (ENA) Engineering 
Recommendation ER G91, issue 1, 2012 specifies that 
substation batteries should have enough capacity to meet the 
standing demand for at least 72 hours for those substations that 
would require to deliver black start services [6]. In secondary 
substation applications, 24 hours of backup power could 
maintain the operation during unexpected loss of power 
scenarios. 
 
Considering the above communication requirements, several 
implementation and integration challenges exist. Most 
wireless technologies used to connect secondary substations 
face the following challenges and limitations: 
 Integration with legacy communication equipment, some 
existing hardware have limited capabilities in supporting 
new communication protocols and security features. 
 Interoperability between secondary substation 
communication and different vendor monitoring and 
control equipment, for example an LV monitoring system 
may not employ standard communications. 
 Secure remote access to secondary substation functions by 
the DSO and third party service providers. A particular 
challenge is the overhead needed for secure 
communications using bandwidth constrained legacy 
communications. 
 Limitations with licenced radio frequency (RF) spectrum 
available to DSOs for secure exchange of data with 
secondary substations, particularly when considering 
data-rich applications such as power quality monitoring 
and asset condition diagnostics. 
 Reach and penetration of communication technologies for 
hard to reach areas such as underground LV link boxes. 
 
Current arrangements for secondary substation automation 
varies between the DSOs, and the bandwidth requirements (for 
several DSOs) are in the range 3 – 5 kbps per site to remotely 
control and monitor their MV switching units and automation 
nodes. Some of the communication channels which may be 
still used in the secondary substations (i.e. UHF telemetry) are 
narrowband and limited in bandwidth which cannot be 
deployed for applying some security measures. Furthermore, 
extra communication bandwidth is required for voice services 
to support the DSO during black start scenarios in case DSO 
private communications should be used where mobile network 
operators lose power during a blackout.  Moreover, new 
connected distributed assets such as charging points, LV 
monitoring and control functions and integration of DER may 
demand more bandwidth, particularly if they rely on 
communication with or via the substation. 
 
3 Data Flow and Methodology for Bandwidth 
Calculations 
In order to determine the bandwidth requirements for the 
secondary substations of the future, the DSO use cases 
considering the number of communicating nodes, 
measurement and control points and connected field devices in 
each secondary substation should be specified. Subsequently, 
the data flow between the communicating entities can be 
defined. This is practically the distribution management 
system (DMS) polling the RTU measurements and the 
protocol used to communicate between the RTU and DMS. It 
is assumed that future deployment of RTU connectivity will 
comply with IEC 62351, which is the data and communication 
security standard for power systems management and 
associated information exchange, including IEC 61850, DNP3 
or IEC 60870-5-104 [7]. 
 
3.1 LV Engine smart control system use case architecture 
The LV Engine project is a national innovation project led by 
SP Energy Networks and funded by the UK regulator Ofgem 
to design and trial a power electronics based Smart 
Transformer (ST) that performs a number of flexibility 
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functions including: power flow control and transformer load 
sharing; LV feeder voltage regulation, MV reactive power 
compensation and provision for DC loading. The smart 
functions of the ST are controlled and coordinated through a 
Smart Control System (SCS), which communicates with the 
ST, DMS and controllable LV linkbox switches (C_LVS).It 
also has access to LV and MV metering data. The SCS 
architecture design for LV Engine is based on integrated 
communications between a regional smart controller (RSC) 
and local smart controllers (LSC). This architecture (shown in 
Fig 1) is specified by SP Energy Networks [8]. The LSC 
communicates with the ST, C_LVS and RSC via the master 
gateway (RSC and the master gateway reside within the SP 
Energy Networks operational management zone). The RSC 
also has access to smart metering data, integrates with the 
DMS and LCSs deployed in secondary substations. 
 
 
Fig. 1 LV Engine SCS high Level communication architecture 
The C_LVS requires a communication gateway to enable data 
exchange with the LSC in the secondary substation. The 
gateway should have at least an Ethernet and radio interface 
for RTU and wireless network integration respectively. The 
communication and data integration between the components 
of the SCS and selection of suitable communications 
technologies requires further consideration of bandwidth and 
cyber security. The required bandwidth is to exchange 
messages between field device and control centre whereas, 
cyber security is to ensure the encryption for the data and 
establish secure connection by authentication. The secondary 
substation gateway will collect data and measurements from 
the C_LVS and LSC and communicates to the master gateway, 
which in turn forwards the messages to be processed, analysed 
or archived centrally. 
 
As shown in Fig 1, the secondary substation gateway 
communicates to the master gateway via public mobile radio 
technology such as 4G/3G/GPRS access point that supports 
the DNP3/IEC104 protocols or via a private wireless 
technology deployed by the DSO such as private LTE. The 
gateway should be configured to send/receive data to/from 
three locations (master gateway and the LSC and NOP). The 
C_LVS gateway should be equipped with a radio and an 
Ethernet interface. The transmitted data from the C_LVS in the 
link box to the LSC via third party networks such as public 
3G/4G technology should be sent via an Encapsulating 
Security Payload (ESP) within the IPSec protocol suite, which 
provides authentication, integrity, and confidentially of 
network packets data/payload. 
 
3.2 LV Engine SCS data flows 
The first step to determining the bandwidth requirements for 
the LV Engine SCS, is to identify the data flows between 
communicating components as identified in the section 3.1. 
Namely the Normally Open Point (NOP), Local Smart 
Controller (LSC) and Regional Smart Controller (RSC). These 
data flows and subsequent bandwidth calculations are needed 
for any future deployments of communications between the 
DSO control centre and secondary substations. The bandwidth 
calculations assume the use of DNP3 or IEC 60870-5-104 
(IEC104) protocols as specified by SP Energy Networks which 
is based on their outlook for using these protocols for new 
communications hardware. The results showed in this paper 
are based on the following assumptions: 
 
 The message size for each protocol and the estimated 
polling rates are based on empirical experience from 
previous and ongoing projects at the PNDC that tested off 
the shelf communication equipment (e.g. RTU). 
 The security overhead is based on 2 levels of security for 
IEC104 (i.e. IPsec and TLS) whereas for DNP3 
calculations are based only on IPsec level of security 
which follows industry practice. 
 The maximum latency requirement of the LV Engine 
(according to the ST technical specification) is 10s for 
DC, HV, LV AC voltage set point and LV active and 
reactive power set points.  
 
4 Bandwidth requirements 
The calculated bandwidth for the LV Engine based on un-
batching polling messages (for IEC 104) and no class reporting 
(for DNP3) are shown in Table 1 and Table 2. Monthly data 
usage is also provided. It is assumed that an RSC is connected 
to 18 LSCs when the RSC is located in the primary substation 
(in line with typical maximum connectivity possible via 
UHF/VHF radio communications currently used for secondary 
substations as advised by SP Energy Networks).  It is possible 
that the RSC is located in the primary substation – at which 
point a risk-based decision will need to be made with regards 
to how many LSCs the RSC should communicate with taking 
into account the impact of RSC loss on the performance of 
LSCs and subsequent impact on the performance on the LV 
Engine SCS and control objectives. 
 
The bandwidth calculations included the overhead of security 
requirements applicable to DSOs, which aim to provide an 
adequate mutual authentication and encryption layer above the 
TCP/IP layer and over the transport security layer (TLS) 
protocol. Based on the IEC 62351 security standard, DNP3 and 
IEC 60870-05-104 should be secured with two levels of 
security. Security through authentication and encryption are 
required and the DSO should comply with these requirements. 
In the bandwidth calculations, two levels of security have been 
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applied to the connection and the transmitted data. The first 
level is through the device itself and the second level of 
security is from the IPsec through a VPN between the routers. 
The number of analogue data points communicated by the 
C_LVS and LSC are 12 and 87 analogues respectively based 
on the data flow analysis. Whereas, the number of digitals are 
2 and 23 digitals respectively. The polling time is considered 
as 90 seconds, which is typical for the DSO. 
 
Table 1 Calculated bandwidth for secure IEC104 (un-
batching) 
Secure IEC104 Required data rate 
(bps)  
monthly data with 
IPsec (Mbyte) 
 
C_LVS 588 190 
LSC 3979 1290 
RSC 71620  23205 
 
Table 2 Calculated bandwidth for DNP3 protocol (un-
batching) 
DNP3 with IP 
security 
Required data rate 
(bps)  
monthly data with 
IPsec (Mbyte) 
 
C_LVS 563 183 
LSC 3379 1095 
RSC 60806  19701 
 
Results analysis show that the overhead caused by the IPsec 
will vary based on the message size. Smaller message sizes 
will result in a higher overhead in terms of bandwidth needs. 
Bandwidth characterisation of RTU traffic carried out at the 
PNDC indicates that the message size is a significant factor 
influencing the security overhead as a percentage of the packet 
caused by the IPsec through a VPN. The security requirement 
for LV Engine with un-batch reporting may cost (22 - 28%) of 
the total required bandwidth. Remote access for 
reconfiguration and maintenance can be bursty and bandwidth 
consuming, as two levels of security for authentication and 
encryption could increase the current bandwidth requirements 
by 2 to 3 folds. The configuration of each protocol (DNP3 and 
IEC104) will determine the exchanged messages size and their 
required polling, which in turn affects the bandwidth. DNP3 
and IEC 104 can support batch reporting which enables the 
DNP3/IEC104 packets to contain several measurement points 
in the same message, and as result decrease the required 
bandwidth. 
 
5 Conclusion 
Sufficient spectrum in a suitable band (below 1 GHz) is 
required to enable a secure wireless communication 
technology between the secondary substation and the DSO 
enterprise network. Enhanced security is needed to enable new 
functionality in a connected secondary substation and fulfil the 
requirements of the future DSOs. The security overhead 
represents an average of 2-3 fold increase in bandwidth if both 
IPsec and TLS are deployed to secure the connected asset. The 
configuration of DNP3/IEC-104, frequency of 
analogue/digital polling and the level of implemented security 
for authentication and encryption are the main factors that 
affect the bandwidth. It is recommended for the purposes of 
saving bandwidth to use batching polling messages (for IEC 
104) and class reporting (for DNP3). Medium and long-term 
RTU connectivity should meet LV monitoring requirements 
(i.e. suitable interfaces and standard communication 
standards). The communication technology for LV substation 
monitoring should not be considered as a standalone service. 
DSOs should consider, in detail, the appropriate 
communication technology that can meet the requirements of 
the LV monitoring in addition to secondary substation 
functions such as monitoring and MV control. A private 
network operated by the DSOs is thought to offer the best 
compromise option to meet the current and future DSO needs 
and effectively recover from a black start scenario. 
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